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Abstract: Rapid technological developments make firms favor the creation of new approaches to corporate entrepreneurship and technology ma-
nagement. One approach, corporate-startup collaboration has reached a new level in the 21st Century and many different models currently exist 
as a result. However, research on how to evaluate the effects of those collaboration models is limited, and in some cases, non-existent. The purpose 
of this paper is to test if an analytical framework developed for measuring the results from corporate-startup co-location, also could be useful for 
measuring the results of other types of corporate-startup collaboration models. The framework is tested through the lens of the corporation and the 
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Introduction
Rapid technological development creates a tremendous pressure on in-
cumbents to radically change the way they are organizing their inno-
vation processes, if they will have a chance of surviving and prospering 
(March, 1991; Christensen & Overdorf, 2000; Badescu & Garcés-
Ayerbee, 2009; Lee et al., 2012). This drives the creation and diffusion 
of new types of entrepreneurship (Oukil, 2011; Nambisan, 2017), affec-
ting large firms to change their approach to corporate entrepreneurship. 
Therefore, as a complement to internal R&D, high technology stra-
tegic alliances can offer large firms access to technologies (Clauss & 
Spieth, 2017; Roth et al., 2017; Aggarwal & Kapoor, 2018). Corporate-
startup collaboration, as one form of strategic alliances, is increasin-
gly becoming an attractive strategy (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015; 
Steiber & Alänge, 2020). For this reason, many different models have 
been developed and applied by large firms (Steiber & Alänge, 2020). 
‘Corporate-startup collaboration models’ are here viewed as a manage-
ment initiative, following an open innovation paradigm (Chesbrough, 
2003) and an extensive amount of previous research exists on different 
models for corporate-startup collaboration. However, research on how to 
evaluate and measure the results from those different types of collabora-
tions, is limited, and in some cases non-existent (Steiber & Alänge, 2020).
The purpose of this paper is to test if an analytical framework, deve-
loped for measuring the results from corporate-startup co-location 
could also be useful for measuring the effects from other types of cor-
porate-startup collaboration models. 
The sections below start with a theoretical context that present main 
findings from earlier literature reviews on frameworks and metrics, 
followed by the methodology for the empirical study used for this 
paper. The paper ends with a discussion on how useful the analytical 
framework is for different types of corporate-startup collaboration 
models. Finally, conclusions, implications, as well as limitations and 
future research will be presented. 
Theoretical Context
Chesbrough (2003) developed the open innovation concept from ob-
servations of inbound and outbound streams of technology at large 
firms. The fast technological development in most industries is now 
increasing the emphasis on startups’ role in corporate innovation, as 
the strength of small technology startups is their ability to develop not 
only new product and process innovations rapidly and test them on 
‘early adopters’ (Rogers, 1983), but also to develop entirely new busi-
ness models. For large firms, technology startups can also allow the 
large firm to be part of the construction of totally new entrepreneurial 
ecosystems (Drori & Wright, 2018). 
Models for corporate-startup collaboration
Several different models for corporate-startup collaboration have 
been identified. Based on a several years long research study, Steiber 
& Alänge (2020) identified and described eight models for corporate-
startup collaboration: 1. Acquisition, 2. Corporate Venturing, 3. Inter-
nal Corporate Incubator, 4. Internal Corporate Accelerator, 5. Platform, 
6. Corporate Startup Program, 7. Co-Creation and 8. Co-Location. The 
different models will be described below in accordance to the findings 
from Steiber & Alänge (2020).
Acquisition and Corporate Venturing are models using an outside-in 
flow as well as an equity-based model. Acquisition is when the lar-
ge firm acquires the startup. Corporate- venturing, is when the firm 
invest (rather than build or ally for new technologies) in external 
startups of strategic interest. 
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Models using an inside-out flow as well as an equity-based model are 
the third and fourth models; Internal Corporate Incubator and Inter-
nal Corporate Accelerator. In an internal corporate incubator, inter-
nal ideas may lead to spinout companies and in the internal accelera-
tor program, cohorts of (here internal) idea providers are coached to 
take their ideas further. 
Models using an inside-out flow as well as a non- equity-based mo-
del are platforms and corporate startup programs. By platforms it is 
meant a large firm’s proprietary platform, e.g., Android or iOS. The 
‘Platform model’ is an Inside-out approach in which the larger firm 
invites complementary external startup innovation to advance exis-
ting corporate innovation (the platform), but also to strengthen the 
large firm’s ecosystem. The primary purpose of a Corporate Startup 
Program such as e.g. Google for Startups, is for the large firm to sup-
port entrepreneurs with access to the large firm’s products, services, 
or other assets and thereby sustaining or even expanding the ecosys-
tem around the large firm’s products and services. 
Finally, co-creation and co-location are models using an outside-in and 
non-equity-based model. Co-creation is a management initiative that 
brings different parties together in order to jointly produce a mutually 
valued outcome. Business co-location is the placement of several enti-
ties in a single location. In the context of co-location of tech startups 
close to a host corporation, co-location is a rather new phenomenon. 
Based on the above information, knowledge currently exist on mo-
dels for collaboration between corporations and startups. However, 
earlier research on these corporate-startup collaboration models 
has shown that there is very limited research on how to measure and 
evaluate each model’s results in terms of e.g. financial gains and in-
creased innovation rate for the corporation, as well as the success rate 
for the startup. In the last decade, when local governments have in-
creased their investments in new corporate-startup collaboration ini-
tiatives, the effect on local ecosystems has also become an important 
factor to track (Steiber & Alänge, 2020).
The development of an analytical framework for corporate-startup 
co-location
Earlier research on corporate-startup collaboration models has shown 
that there is very limited research on how to measure and evaluate 
each model’s result. Further, research on co-creation and co-location 
has shown that knowledge on how to measure and evaluate these two 
models is more or less non-existent (Steiber, 2020). For this reason, 
Steiber (2020) decided to conduct an extensive literature review on 
the model ‘corporate-startup co-location’ with the purpose of develo-
ping an analytical framework for measuring and evaluating the result 
of this specific model.
A broader literature study on business co-location was therefore con-
ducted on the phenomenon ‘Business co-location’. Previous research 
on this phenomenon was found in five primary areas of research; 
‘cluster theories’, ‘ecosystem theories, network theories’, theories 
on knowledge dissemination, as well as on corporate coworking 
(spaces). In total (60) abstracts from A and B rated scientific arti-
cles were selected. After a more thorough scanning of the 60 articles, 
32 articles were finally selected and read to provide a better unders-
tanding of business co-location from five different perspectives (see 
Table 1 and literature stream). 
Table 1. Selected articles, based on a literature review (Steiber, 2020)
Article Focus Literature stream
1.Bamford & Ernst, 2002 Manage an Alliance portfolio Economic theories
2.Bouncken et al., 2016 Co-working spaces Collaborative work- spaces and Co-working spaces
3.Cabral & van Winden, 2016 Categories of Co-working spaces Collaborative work- spaces and Co-working spaces
4.Cabral & van Winden, 2018 Categories of Co-working spaces Collaborative work- spaces and Co-working spaces
5.Chesbrough & Rosenbloom (2002) The role of a business model in a context of open innovation Economic theories
6.Chesbrough, 2003 Open innovation: A new paradigm Economic theories
7.Chow & Chan, 2008
Social networks and social trust’ effects on organizational 
knowledge sharing.
Learning and Knowledge- dissemination
8.Cooke, 2002 Cluster theories and if location matters Cluster theories
9.Gallini, 2002 The economies of patents Economic theories
10.Gallivan, 2008 Balancing trust and control in virtual organizations Network/Ecosystem theories
11.Gertler & Levitte, 2005 Network theory and knowledge flows Network/Ecosystem theories
12.Holste & Fields, 2010 Trust and tacit knowledge sharing and use Learning and Knowledge- dissemination
13.Inkpen & Tsang, 2005 Social capital, network and knowledge transfer Learning and Knowledge- dissemination
14.Irving et al., 2020 Co-working space Collaborative work- spaces and Co-working spaces
15.Lemarié et al., 2001
Small business economics and the importance of geographical and 
organizational proximity
Network/Ecosystem theories
16.McKelvey et al., 2003




Platforms, communities and ecosystems and technology entrepre-
neurship
Network/Ecosystem theories
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18.Nagy & Lindsay, 2018 Collaborative co-working spaces Collaborative work- spaces and Co-working spaces
19.Nonaka, 1994 Organizational knowledge creation Learning and Knowledge- dissemination
20.Porter et al.,2005 Institutional embeddedness of high-tech regions Cluster theories
21.Robinson et al., 2007 Clusters and networks in nanotechnology Cluster theories
22.Romero & Molina, 2011 Collaborative networked organization and Knowledge dissemination Network/Ecosystem theories
23.Simard and West, 2006 Open innovation and knowledge networks and geographic locus of innovation Learning and Knowledge- dissemination
24.Song et al., 2007 Knowledge dissemination and the importance of co-location of resources Learning and Knowledge- dissemination
25.Stuart & Sorenson, 2003 Geographical proximity and spatial heterogeneity Cluster theories
26.Teece, 1986a Transaction cost economics and the multinational enterprise Economic theories
27.Teece, 1986 Profiting from technological innovation Economic theories
28.Teece, 1989 Inter-organizational requirements on the innovation process Economic theories
29.Valkokari et al., 2017 Orchestrating innovation ecosystems Network/Ecosystem theories
30.Vanhaverbeke, 2006 Open innovation and inter-organizational networks Network/Ecosystem theories
31.Yeung et al., 2006 Collective bargaining power and cluster theory Cluster theories
32.Zenun et al., 2007 Project management and performance (team co-location) Learning and Knowledge- dissemination
Through the broadened search for literature under the heading of 
‘business co-location’, Steiber (2020) identified a number of insights 
on business co-location in the form of underlying objectives with 
co-location initiatives, results observed, as well as factors that could 
affect those results. 
As a result, a three- dimensions framework was suggested. The three 
dimensions are; the ‘stakeholder dimension’, the ‘performance dimen-
sion’, and a time dimension (see Figure 1).
Figure. 1: Three- dimensions framework for corporate-startup co-location 
(Steiber, 2020) 
In the literature review, conducted by Steiber (2020), several different 
stakeholders were identified such as: the corporation, the unit for co-
llaboration (e.g. an incubator), the startup, but also local governments 
and other public funding agencies, as well as universities and uni-
versity incubators that at times work as a facilitator for establishing 
innovation collaboration between startups and incumbents. 
For each stakeholder, the performance metrics differ. For example, 
for a corporation metrics are related to; return on investment, tech-
nology and innovation, customer relationship development, brand 
development, acquisition of new talent, corporate culture, and own 
ecosystem development. For a startup, however, metrics identified 
are; go-to-market relevant metrics as well as strategic business de-
velopment metrics. From the perspective of the ‘dyad’ (the unit for 
collaboration) metrics are, process and result metrics focused on 
growth of the accelerator or incubator, economic results of the acce-
lerator/incubator, and the performance of accelerated/incubated ven-
tures. Finally, from an ecosystem perspective (usually represented by 
the local government), metrics related to the economic development 
of the region, such as: job creation, sustainability of local startups, in-
novations brought to industrial firms, and more have been identified 
in previous research.
Finally, regarding the ‘time dimension’, corporate-startup collabora-
tions evolve over time and Steiber (2020) found that there was a need 
to add a dynamic dimension, labeled the ‘time dimension’. 
Methodology: an empirical case study
    
The analysis of the literature highlights a dearth of empirical, explo-
ratory studies in the field of inter-organizational learning (Anand et 
al., in press). Consequently, we adopted an exploratory multiple case 
study approach (Danneels, 2002; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
 
The empirical study for this paper was conducted from March to June 
2020 and focused primarily on the perspectives of the corporate and 
the dyad (the unit for collaboration). In total 10 cases, representing 
five different models for corporate-startup collaboration were inclu-
ded in the empirical study. At the date of the interview, the authors 
had previous knowledge about the cases as the firms have been part 
of the authors’ earlier empirical studies in 2017, 2018, and in 2019. 
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As a consequence, the interview questions could primarily focus 
on the topic of the study, objectives behind their corporate-startup 
collaboration initiative, and frameworks and metrics applied by the 
companies used for the different models of corporate-startup collabo-
ration. However, the interview also captured data on how the specific 
company’s model has evolved over time. 
The purpose was to test the analytical framework developed for cor-
porate-startup co-location by Steiber (2020) and see if it could be use-
ful also for other corporate-startup collaboration models. 
The interviews were conducted with former or current leaders of the 
dyads, typically scheduled as 1.0 to 1.5 hours. Each interview was re-
corded and transcribed. The interview questionnaire was semi-struc-
tured and organized according to the three dimensions in figure 1. 
In those cases where the initiator of the dyad model was still actively 
involved in the dyad, the data provided a relevant perspective on the 
corporate objectives and metrics used at the time of the decision to 
establish the initiative. In several cases, the initiator on the dyad level 
had moved forward to other positions, or sometimes even to other 
companies - and then the data collected in the empirical study was 
based on the experience of the leaders that took over the programs, 
and their access to written documentation concerning the start.
Each interview started off with an introduction and clarification of 
the interviewee’s role, responsibilities and the current status of the 
unit for collaboration (e.g. the primary role of the unit, processes and 
services offered, and number of startups engaged). As the authors 
have followed the evolution of the different dyads, recent changes of 
the unit were also discussed. Second, the discussion was narrowed 
down to the framework, which was shown to the interviewee over 
zoom. The framework was explained by the authors, and overall fe-
edback from the interviewee was collected. Third, the interviewers 
used the semi-structured questionnaire and asked the interviewee to 
describe from his/her perspective what objectives and metrics had 
been used/were used at the start of the initiative, currently used, and 
will be used at any major evaluation of the initiative in the future (the 
time dimensions was therefore used first among the three dimen-
sions).  Then the interviewers asked the interviewee to go more in de-
tails on each metric and why it had been/was used. In this discussion, 
not only the purpose with the metrics became clear but also for what 
stakeholder it was for. For example, several of the units for collabora-
tion also measured things that were important for the success of the 
startup. Further, as several of the initiatives were funded by the local 
government, they also measured things that they needed to report to 
the government in annual, or final reports. 
Results from the empirical study
In the empirical study the analytical framework for corporate-startup 
co-location was tested on several different corporate-startup collabo-
ration models. 
All in all, 10 corporate-startup collaboration initiatives were inter-
viewed: BioVentureHub (AstraZeneca), SynerLeap powered by ABB 
(shortly referred here as SynerLeap), TestaCenter (Cytiva, former 
GE HealthCare), Electrolux Open Innovation, Ericsson Garage in 
Gothenburg, Ericsson One in Stockholm, The Greenhouse (Lantmän-
nen), Stena New Ventures, Stena Recycling Lab, and CampX (Volvo 
Group). Together, they represent five of the models presented in Stei-
ber & Alänge (2020): Co-location, Co-creation, Internal Corporate 
Accelerator, Internal Corporate Incubator, and Corporate Venture.
The starting point for three of the cases (Ericsson Garage, Ericsson 
One and the Greenhouse) was an ambition to primarily create condi-
tions for internal idea providers to develop their ideas, i.e. inside-out 
models (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). However, these three cases, 
all later on decided to also invite external entrepreneurs and startups 
to further stimulate their intrapreneurs. Five of the cases started from 
an outside-in perspective – with the primary intention to source ex-
ternal ideas, technology and entrepreneurial culture (BioVentureHub, 
SynerLeap, Electrolux OI, Stena New Ventures, Stena Recycling Lab). 
Finally, two of the cases (TestaCenter and CampX), had from the start 
both a strong outside-in focus but simultaneously an inside-out in-
tention. In the case of TestaCenter the inside-out intention concerns 
the interest in making its products well known among startups being 
trained at Testa Center towards industrializing, and in the case of 
CampX the external startups being invited come to an environment 
where they meet intrapreneurs and a substantial number of emplo-
yees working in innovation projects together with external industry 
partners. 
Interestingly, the majority of the outside-in cases enter into non-
equity relations with the participating startups (BioVentureHub, Sy-
nerLeap , TestaCenter, Electrolux OI, CampX). Even the cases where 
investment resources are ready- available, it has not been put into 
the forefront, rather the focus has been on innovation collaboration 
through non-equity forms (Stena New Ventures and Stena Recycling 
Lab). The inside-out approaches are either integrating the new pro-
jects into existing business areas or consider equity-investment in 
spinouts.
Next, the findings from the empirical study will be presented below 
under the headings: rationale behind the initiative, overall objectives, 
and categories of metrics applied.
Rationale behind the new initiative
Each corporation had their own rationale behind the start of the new 
collaboration initiative. This in turn led to different set ups, or models. 
In several cases the original idea of a specific initiative came from in-
dividual employees who presented their ideas for corporate leaders 
and received their support to move on to design the specific initiative. 
Thus, the belief in the need of the new initiative and its objective(s), 
were anchored with the corporate leadership that decided to support 
the development of the initiative, for example in the cases of: Ericsson 
Garage, Ericsson One, Electrolux Open Innovation function, Stena 
Metall’s New Ventures and Recycle Lab, and CampX. In the case of 
Ericsson Garage that originated in Stockholm, the continued diffu-
sion of the initiative to other locations was based on local needs and 
local initiatives that coordinated both with the local site management 
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and with the central Garage organization in Stockholm. CampX was 
an integrated part of a major CEO initiative for establishing collabo-
ration with external competence, including startups. The Greenhouse 
case, on the other hand, was initiated by change agents within the 
R&D organization and was later included into the corporate strategy 
based on evidence from running two cycles of acceleration. Howe-
ver, in three cases where the government contributed with funding, 
BioVentureHub, SynerLeap and TestaCenter, the initiative came from 
strong change agents within the organizations. For the latter three, the 
funding from the government played a key role to start the unit for 
collaboration with startups. 
Another important factor for the creation and development of each 
case was the inspiration and learning from each other through study 
visits, both on own initiatives and by taking part of common research 
projects on dyads (Steiber & Alänge, 2020). These learning proces-
ses also led to clear differentiations between the models, e.g. in 
the case of Stena New Ventures and Ericsson Garage in different 
locations. This led in some cases to similar models but with very 
different objectives, e.g. in the cases of: BioVentureHub that aims 
for disruptive innovation outside of the core product areas of As-
traZeneca and views itself as a growth catalyst for independent 
companies; and SynerLeap that invites startups with the ambition 
of creating collaboration projects inside ABB and providing sup-
port to explore  funding possibilities through ABB Technology 
Ventures. Stena Metall, with its Stena New Ventures and Stena Re-
cycling Lab, had clear objectives with its initiatives and by learning 
from other large corporations and their models, they could take 
components that fit well with their own objectives, but also dis-
regard components that fit less well. This was specifically the case 
with companies joining a bit later and that learned from the other 
companies, starting early with corporate-startup collaboration 
initiatives. Another effect from the joint learning process was also 
that companies joining later could drastically speed up their pro-
cess of designing and establishing their new initiative. This could 
partly be explained by the fact that the companies got, and still get, 
not only inspiration from one another, but also utilize experiences 
and formats/routines from the other companies to develop their own 
model faster. 
Finally, depending on the specific context and needs of a corporation 
and the learning generated from running a specific model, changes 
were introduced in the practices on a dyad level. In some cases, this 
learning process resulted from a conscious revision of the original ra-
tionale and objectives, both on a corporate and a dyad level. Further 
evolution of the models has been taken place in all of the 10 empirical 
cases. 
Overall objectives 
The objectives expressed at a corporate level differ between the ca-
ses, but one common objective expressed in all cases is a need of 
establishing relationships to a community of startups and entrepre-
neurs in order to access new ideas and technology needed for the 
future development of the large corporation. In many cases it has 
also been expressed a need of changing the enterprise culture at the 
large firm by having direct contact with entrepreneurs and startups, 
and one objective in several cases was to become more innovative 
and agile. For example, SynerLeap has a very clear objective on spe-
eding up innovation cycle time by working with multiple startups 
at the same time. BioVentureHub, TestaCenter and CampX, all 
emphasize the impact on knowledge transfer and new agile work 
processes. Several of the cases such as: BioVentureHub, TestaCenter, 
and the Greenhouse mentioned that their approach to support star-
tup companies and external entrepreneurs was essential for stren-
gthening the ecosystem or industry in which the large firm is part of, 
and thus by strengthening the ecosystem also strengthening the firm. 
Furthermore, the development of a talent pool for recruiting people 
with relevant knowledge was important for most of the cases, which 
also led some companies to cooperate with external providers, such 
as universities (TestaCenter) and other external providers of trai-
ning programs (The Greenhouse). In some cases, the objective is 
also commercial, e.g. by educating startups in the large firm’s equi-
pment and methodologies, which later could lead to startups beco-
ming new customers to the large firm.
Categories of metrics applied
In theory, the evaluation of a project should be conducted as a com-
parison between the obtained results at the end of the set project time 
and the objectives set at the start of the project – this is also based on 
an assumption that the objectives have been possible to follow-up and 
measured during, and at project closure. Looking into the empirical 
data, in most cases there were corporate objectives set from the start – 
except in one case where the initiative was taken bottom-up and after 
showing some results, two year into the project, the corporate leader-
ship were formally involved in establishing a revised set of objectives 
(Lantmännen).
In most cases there were no agreed upon ways to measure the attain-
ment of objectives, i.e. there were no specific metrics. In the cases when 
metrics were set upfront from the corporate perspective, they focused 
on one or a few specific deliverables related to the objectives. For exam-
ple, for Ericsson Garage Gothenburg: “Pitch 2 projects twice a year for 
Global Ericsson Garage in Stockholm” or for Ericsson One: “One new 
game changer per year with a 1-billion- dollar market potential.”
As the objectives set on a corporate level typically did not include 
defined ways to measure the fulfillment of theme, qualitative repor-
ting of activities became the norm for many of the cases. Indicators 
of activities were developed on the dyad level for internal follow-up 
and reflection on what was being accomplished and how it could 
be further improved. Typical activity indicators could concern at-
tractiveness (no. of visitors; no. of applicants; utility of equipment), 
exploration (no. of startups in the hub, no. of internal ideas, no. of 
external ideas) or collaboration (no. of collaboration projects (e.g. 
at Stena New Ventures/Recycling Lab, SynerLeap, and Electrolux 
Open Innovation). 
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In several cases the dyads constructed funnels to reach the ultima-
te outcome, such as Ericsson One (1000 ideas – 60 ideation pro-
jects – 10 MVP to test) or Stena New Ventures (100 good ideas – 5 
developed ideas – 3 tested – 1 launched). In other cases, it was 
an outspoken intention not to use traditional metrics and instead 
base the direction on a vision and broad objective, combined with 
a continual dialogue with the corporate level based on description 
of activities, collaborations generated, and innovations introdu-
ced (e.g. BioVentureHub, Ericsson Garage, CampX, and Electrolux 
Open Innovation).
For three of the cases that were started with government funding, 
BioVentureHub, SynerLeap and TestaCenter, the specific stakeholder 
perspective of the funding agency Vinnova, influenced the follow-up 
measurements due to demands on a regular reporting to Vinnova. For 
example, those cost directly related to public funding and outcomes 
in terms of support to development of external startups and entrepre-
neurs. However, also those follow- up reports were based on a dialo-
gue, rather than hard core metrics.
A specific point that several of the interviewees mentioned was the 
impact of learning by running the model – over several cycles or years. 
As a result, new knowledge and insights were generated and some 
of the cases were characterized by in-depth reflection on the content 
which resulted in major changes (e.g. The Greenhouse and Electrolux 
Open Innovation). Also, for the BioVentureHub, the realization of fu-
ture sector convergence resulted in a major change in the criteria for 
selecting companies to enter into the hub to co-locate, opening up 
for other technology areas than those traditionally related to phar-
maceuticals. Further, also other insights led to the opening up of the 
environment for R&D units for medium sized and larger companies 
(initially it was more early phase startups), and also to an increased 
focus on international companies (e.g. Ericsson One and SynerLeap, 
which for instance onboarded Indian startups in order to further 
strengthen the collaboration between the local startup ecosystem and 
ABB in India)).
These changes in focus and practices on a dyad level, called for 
revisions of dyads’ objectives and metrics, and in some degree 
for corporate objectives and metrics. In addition, the programs 
with government funding, the changing priorities were being 
communicated and discussed with Vinnova that took the changes 
into consideration. Those changes are part of Vinnova’s own lear-
ning process as the phenomenon of dyads is a rather new one (in-
terview, June 2020) and will therefore lead to changes also in their 
follow ups of the hubs, e.g. at the final ex-post evaluation (after 10 
years) of these programs. 
Discussion 
The trigger to establish the collaboration initiative came in some ca-
ses from the corporate leadership, and in some cases as a bottom up 
approach through an internal, strong change agent. In some of the 
latter, the funding from the government played an important role for 
the corporate decision to invest in the new initiative.
The empirical study proved clearly that the ‘stakeholder dimen-
sion’, as well as the ‘performance dimension’ played important ro-
les in evaluating the collaboration initiative. In all cases, the large 
firm had initial objectives, or ‘beliefs’ behind the initiatives. There 
was a common belief that the initiative would positively affect the 
innovativeness of the large firm, either by having the large firm 
being approached to new ideas, technologies or even new business 
models, but also by getting a positive entrepreneurial spill-over 
effect to the large firm’s own culture and way of doing. In addition, 
in some cases the belief was that it would be good also for the 
brand of the company or customer relations (see Table 2). Those 
beliefs, or in some cases objectives fit very well with what previous 
research has identified, presented in the theoretical context above. 
However, it also deviates to some extent from previous research 
as none of the 10 cases, not even those with a possibility to invest 
in the startups, seem to focus primarily on return on investment. 
This might be a result of the strong belief that the collaboration 
with startups was necessary for innovation, access to talents, etc. 
In regard to the dyads, objectives and metrics on a dyad-level also 
fit well with previous research as the 10 cases measured the growth 
of the ‘collaboration unit’, and later in some cases also the perfor-
mance of the startups engaged in the program. Again, however, a 
deviation was identified, now in the form of ‘economic results’ of 
the unit. None of the cases mentioned this area as one that was 
measured. This might be explained by the same reason as used 
above for the corporation.
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Table 2: Performance metrics and a stakeholder perspective 
Corporate Dyad
Knowledge/Learning
On a Corporate level the most frequently mentioned 
objectives were:
1. Knowledge and learning from startups: about ne-
eds, new technology and the culture of working in an 
entrepreneurial and agile way
2.Training employees in a more entrepreneurial and 
agile way of working.
• Dyads seldom received metrics related to corporate objectives. Ins-
tead, dyads developed objectives and metrics based on both the input 
from corporate perspective and their own focus, for example:
 
1. Internal focus:
• No. of internal people engaged – culture influence
• No. of R&D people involved
• No of new technology areas represented among startups
• No. of startup projects with employees participating
• No. of internal ideas entered the program
• No. of employees who know that you can come with your own idea 
and start developing it.
2. External focus:
• No. of visitors – attending seminars at the Dyad
• No. of external startups connected to the Dyad
Resources
Developing a talent pool of qualified and entrepre-
neurial individuals
Creating collaboration opportunities 
Identifying potential new suppliers of new technique
Create new growth business through disruptive in-
novation
Dyads seldom received metrics related to the corporate objectives.
Dyads developed several resource measurements:
• No. of startup collaborations
• No. of validated MVPs
• No. of startups that received internal interest
• No of startups that together with corporate’s solutions reached market 
• No. of startups that became global technology provider to the corpo-
ration
• Investment (USD) in startups
• No. of sold products to startups as future customers
Network/Ecosystem
In some cases, it was an explicit objective to support 
the development of ecosystems to the benefit of the 
corporate (in terms of future access to ideas, technol-
ogy, innovation and talent)
Dyads seldom received metrics related to the corporate objectives.
Dyad developed measurements: 
• Geographical location of startups
• No. of contracted startups
• No. of university researchers engaged
• No. of people attending events
• No. of relations created to universities and high schools
• No. of master theses per year
Other
Attract young talent and make employees stay be-
cause the corporate is perceived as innovative work-
ing with startup – i.e. a direct effect on the brand.
Only two cases focused on mobilizing ideas from the employees and used 
clear metrics set by the corporate:
Examples on metric:
• “Pitch 2 projects twice a year” for central organization
• “One game changer per year with a one- billion- dollar market 
• potential
Important to notice, however is that even if there were strong beliefs 
that the initiative would lead to positive effects for the larger firm, 
very few of the cases had metrics from the start. For example, on a 
dyad level, metrics was a focus area that commonly became more im-
portant over time in parallel with the dyads’ own learning processes. 
As the dyad started to learn about what works and what works less 
well, both for the startups and for the large firm, the knowledge on 
what are valuable to measure and how to measure those things, in-
creased.  In general, though, metrics on a dyad level usually focused 
initially on  ‘process metrics’, e.g. number of startups signed up to 
the dyad, and then over time transferred over to metrics that were 
measuring true value created (e.g. number of startups that were in de-
velopment projects with the large firm), or value captured by both the 
startup and the large firm (e.g. no. of startups that have become global 
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technology providers to the large firm). It was also identified to be im-
portant for the dyad to be measured on things that they actually could 
control. In this context, one of our interviewees commented from the 
dyad level: “it is important to measure what you can control although 
what is outside of control of the dyad at times also is being measured”. 
On a corporate level, metrics, other than very high level ones such 
as “one game changer per year with a one billion dollar market po-
tential”, usually didn’t exist in the beginning (ex.ante). However, over 
time, as the firm learned how the new initiative could create value 
for the large firm, some of the cases established, or plan to establish 
corporate metrics (e.g. SynerLeap, CampX, Ericsson One, Stena Re-
cycling Lab). One example on this could be number of startups that 
became ‘global technology providers’ to the large firm. 
Regarding the third dimension, the ‘time dimension’, this dimension 
was trickier to test. While both the stakeholder and performance 
dimension were ‘solid’ in their value when discussing and categori-
zing metrics for the new initiative, the time dimension was a bit har-
der to use as metrics in most cases were not set ex-ante, and in some 
cases not even used in itinere. In addition, many of the cases, speci-
fically the ones without government funding, did not have a certain 
frequency for ex-post evaluations. The cases that had clear ex-post 
evaluations were the cases funded by the government (BioVenture-
Hub, SynerLeap and TestaCenter) as well as the cases in which the 
program was ‘updated’ into new versions at a certain frequency (The 
Greenhouse and Electrolux Open Innovation). For some more details 
from the empirical study, see table 3 below. However, the time dimen-
sion was still found to be valuable and therefore valid as it brought 
new insights on how established objectives and metrics, or thoughts 
on objectives and metrics, had evolved over time.  This dimension 
supported in not only identifying the evolution of objectives and me-
trics but also to identify the triggers to why objectives and metrics 
had changed or are planned to be changed.
Table 3: Performance metrics and a temporal dimension  
Ex-ante In itinere Ex-post
Corporate Vision or a few major objectives – in most 
cases without explicit metrics.
In most cases the reporting is based on qualitati-
ve information of on-going activities and accom-
plishments based on measurements developed 
on dyad level – sometimes based on a funnel 
approach. 
In two cases a major goal and metric was set 
from start and followed up regularly in yearly 
meetings.
Continual evaluation instead of set program 
periods - typically yearly follow up.
Startup n.a. Many metrics developed on dyad level concern 
startup attraction, collaborative projects initiated 
and sometimes also results in terms of startup’s 
market accomplishment.
n.a
Dyad Starting point on dyad level vision and ob-
jectives communicated with corporate, and 
in case of external funding also with natio-
nal funding organization.
Objectives have been developed on a dyad level 
in all cases – in a few cases driven by metrics for-
mulated together with corporate.
One important observation is that following re-
visions, objectives are also modified or changed 
– which need to be considered in evaluations.
Generational revisions based on thorough re-
flection and evaluation of previous generation.
Ecosystem In the case government had partly funded 
the initiative, there was requirements set 
in the contract with the national funding 
organization.
Regular reporting according to standard proce-
dures for the cases funded by national funding 
organization.
National funding organization’s time perspec-
tive 5 or 10 years
To sum up, in all cases there is a clear learning over time, both in the 
generational development cases (The Greenhouse and Electrolux 
Open Innovation) and the yearly evaluated cases (Ericsson Garage, 
Ericsson One, Stena New Ventures, Stena Recycling Lab, CampX), 
as well as in the cases with external Vinnova funding (BioVenture-
Hub, SynerLeap, TestaCenter). This means that the ambition what 
to do and measure might change and that how to do and measure 
continuously is being improved and modified, which means that 
sometimes the changes go beyond or do not support the corporate 
goals from the outset – which indicates that an ex-post evaluation 
cannot simply start from the initial goals, but need to include the dy-
namic learning that has taken place during the on-going program. On 
dyad level, this is managed by modifying measurements that are used 
internally and communicated to the corporate leadership. However, 
also the three cases of external Vinnova funding consider changing 
priorities in their communication – which takes place both through 
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the standard documented process - where the project leader conti-
nuously reports goal fulfilment and changes in stipulated progress re-
ports and in the final report – and in dialogue meetings with Vinnova. 
Based on the above, the empirical study does test the analytical eva-
luation framework and found both the framework and the three di-
mensions being valuable for planning, follow- up, evaluating, and 
comparing different corporate-startup collaboration models over 
time. 
Conclusions and implications
The three-dimensions evaluation framework was found useful, based 
on the result from the empirical study of 10 cases of five totally diffe-
rent corporate-startup collaboration models. 
Both the stakeholder- and the performance dimensions were found 
to be valuable in the discussion with the case companies. The time 
dimension was a bit harder to apply as many hadn’t used this di-
mension themselves, or because the interviewee hadn’t been part 
of the establishment of the new initiative. However, this dimension 
was still found to be valuable as it brought new insights on how ob-
jectives and metrics had evolved over time.  Further, in most cases 
there was a clear learning over time, which means that the ambition 
what to do and measure might change and that how to do and mea-
sure continuously is being improved and modified. Sometimes the 
changes go beyond, or do not support the corporate goals from the 
outset – which indicates that an ex-post evaluation cannot simply 
start from the initial goals but need to include the dynamic lear-
ning that has taken place during the on-going program. On a dyad 
level, this is managed by modifying measurements that are used in-
ternally and communicated to the corporate leadership. The three 
cases with external government funding also consider changing 
priorities, and continuously report goal fulfilment and changes in 
the stipulated progress reports and in dialogue meetings with the 
government agency ‘Vinnova’.  
The implication for managers and researchers is of great importance. 
This paper indicates that the framework presented in this paper po-
tentially could be the generic framework researchers have been loo-
king for in order to measure the result, not only from different corpo-
rate-startup collaboration models in isolation, but also cross models. 
As a corporation usually has not only one of these eight models, but 
several, for example a corporate venture unit and a corporate accele-
rator program such as in the case of Disney and many other compa-
nies, a generic framework would be very valuable for these companies 
to measure the difference in results cross models.
Further, the three-dimensional framework could be used in planning, 
better understanding, and/or developing objectives and metrics for 
business managers staring up and heading up different corporate-
startup collaboration initiatives.  In addition, this paper has showed 
that both managers and researchers need to understand that objec-
tives and metrics are a result of the dyad’s and the large firm’s own 
learning process over time, why those will change over time. It might 
therefore be natural to focus on process metrics at the start and then, 
over time, refine the metrics into metrics that measure true value 
creation and capturing. Objectives and metrics therefore need to 
be viewed from a more dynamic perspective. One way, however, to 
evolve faster in regard to metrics is to learn from other firms that are 
before the own firm on the learning curve. 
Limitations and future research
The framework is including a multi-stakeholder perspective and that 
means that in order to conduct a thorough test of the framework, 
there is a need of data from all perspectives. A natural next step is 
therefore to test the framework from a startup, as well as from an 
ecosystem (e.g. government) perspective. Further, in the interviews 
with dyad level leaders, it was found that an additional important 
input into the dyad’s own goal setting process are other corporate-
wide goals that were not initially included in the decision to start the 
program but were in some cases included when the program was in 
operation. For this reason, there is a value of testing this framework 
further by interviewing also top managers and critical internal deci-
sion-makers such as e.g. head of R&D. This could further contribute 
to the understanding of the decision-making and evaluation process 
within large firms with corporate-startup collaboration initiatives 
ongoing. 
Further, a specific issue needing consideration in future research is 
the meaning of ex post evaluation. The programs with funding from 
Vinnova have natural ex-post time perspectives of 5 years initial fun-
ding and a potential 5 years additional funding, which mean that the-
re is a definite ex-post evaluation to be conducted after 10 years. This 
evaluation will then have two purposes; first, to provide an evaluation 
for the Vinnova funding and second, providing an evaluation to the 
large firm of the value of the dyad to the corporate in the future. In 
the other cases there were no definite ex-post time perspective – ins-
tead, two strategies were used: either a continual yearly reporting to 
the corporate leadership that could result in major revisions; or an 
approach based on reflection on dyad level, viewing the program in a 
generational development perspective, i.e. to make time for reflection 
with the intention of revising and improving the program.
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